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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF ITTAH 
rlJCHAFL PATRICK PAYNE, by 
and through his Guardian ad 
L1tem, John Michael Payne-;-
JOHNM ICHAEL PAYNE; and 
STtPHANIE PAYNE, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
GARTH G. MYERS, M. D.; 
JOSEPH P. KESLER, M. D. 
THE STATE OF UTAH AND 
HANDI\APPED CHILDREN'S 
SEPVICE; and THE DIVISION 
'.W HEALTH OF THE STATE OF 
UT"H, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 19218 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT JOSEPH P. KESLER, M. D. 
Respondent Joseph P. Kesler, M. D., by and through his 
,.,,u~sel of record, respectfully submits this brief pursuant to 
PuJ 0 75, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action seekinri dam;;c-
for "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" against two physic 13 . 
and their state employer. 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, Honorable T1m0t.:_ 
R. Hanson presiding, entered summary judgment dismissing '-
claims against this respondent pursuant to § 63-30-4, Utah C0cc 
Annotated (Supp. 1981) 2 (R. 669, 720). 
1 A "wrongful 1 ife" claim is brought on behalf of a se·1ere. 
defective infant against a physician for the phy.sician's neg:c-
gent failure to inform the child's parents of the potenti'-
disabilities of the child, thereby preventing a choice to a·1c,i 
the child's birth. Cohen, Park v. Chessin: The Continu_'.'::.: 
Judicial Development of the Theory of "Wrongful Life," 4 Am. 1 
L. & Med. 211 (1979); Brown, Wronqful Life: A 1'1isconce1·1c-
Tort, 4 Health Care L. Diq. (B~'A) No. 8, at 5, 10, at n 
(Dec. 1982). A "wrongful birth" claim is brought by the parp•,t 
of a severely defective infant for the cost of raisina t:ic 
child and compensation for the emotional injury of bearino 2· 
unexpectedly handicapped child. Brown, Id. at 10; and see, 
example, Phillips v. United States:-508-F. Supp. 537-(c. 
1980). Unlike the "prenatal-tort" action, in neither wronatJ 
life nor wrongful birth actions is it contended that the neali-
gent treatment caused the infant's abnormalities. Note, ~.':rc;­
ful Life--Impaired Infant's Cause of Action Recognized: CllLC 
der v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 1980 BYU L. Pev. 676, 3t-
l. 
2 All statutory citations are to the Utah Code Annotated urol··· 
otherwise indicated. 
- 2 -
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
c\rder. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pelizaeus-Merzbacher syndrome is a rare, genetically-
transmitted and progressively-degenerative neurological disorder 
characterized by widespread demyelination of the brain sheath 
causing severe motor disorders and, eventually, death. 3 
Michael P. Payne, born to appellants on January 27, 
1979, is afflicted with Pelizaeus-Merzbacher syndrome, as is his 
older brother, Matthew. 4 Shortly after his birth on September 
2, 1975, Matthew exhibited signs of an unknown neurological 
disorder. From November 1976 through the fall of 1977, Matthew 
3 
The syndrome is thought to be carried as an X-1 inked reces-
sive, that is, the mother carries the faulty chromosome. 
~enkes, Textbook of Child Neurology, 133-134 (2d. ed. 1980). A 
male child born to a carrier mother is exposed to a fifty 
perrent risk of beinq afflicted. McKhann, Birth Defects 
~ompendium 861 (D. Bergsma 2d. ed. 1979). 
4 
"Pacts" unsupported by the record appear throughout appel-
lant's hrief and, in particular, in their "Statement of Facts." 
I'' 1 s respondent, therefore, restates the facts which appear as a 
~olter of record, or which appear in the pleadings and are taken 
L true for the purpose of this appeal. See Reliable Furniture 
~v. Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Underwritel?s, Inc., 14 Utah 2d 
169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963); Flick v. Van Tassell, 547 P.2d 204, 
205 (Utah 1976). 
- 3 -
was examined and treated at the Handicapped Children's Ser,; 
an agency of the Utah State Department of Heal th, by respunder'' 
Joseph P. Kesler, M. D., a pediatrician, and Garth G. Myer' 
M. D., a pediatric neurologist (R. 2-4, 182-188). 
It is alleged that Dr. Kesler and Dr. Myers neol1ger·· 
ly failed to diagnose Matthew's impairment as being of genet, 
origin and negligently advised appellants that they could ha•;. 
another child without fear of the affliction recurring (R. ; 
Relying upon that alleged negligent advice, appellants concei·1c· 
and bore their second child, Michael (R. 5). 
This action was filed on behalf of Michael Pa)'C' 
seeking damages for "wrongful life" and by his parents seek~~" 
damages for "wrongful birth" (R. 9). On respondents' mut1cr 
the lower court entered summary judgment against appellants 
the basis that § 63-30-4 precluded any personal 1 iabil ity 
Respondents Kesler and Myers for acts of simple neglige~c' 
arising out of the performance of their official duties IR. 66', 
720). This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
No claim of gross negligence, fraud, or malice 
asserted against this respondent ( R. 6-7). It is und1spc' 
that, at all times relevant to this action, he was an emrl·'·' 
- 4 -
0f a uov1?rnmental entity, the Handicapped Children's Service, 
and that all alleged negligent acts alleged on his part occurred 
rlurinq the performance of his official duties (R. 3, 183). 
provided: 
Section 63-30-4, as amended effective March 30, 1978, 
~£!_E~2~i~i2~~-~2!_£2~~!E~~Q-~~ 
admission or denial of liability--Effect of 
waiver of immunity--Exclusive remedy--Join-
der of employee--Limitations on personal 
liability. Nothing contained in this act, 
unless specifically provided, is to be 
construed as an admission or denial of 
liability or responsibility in so far as 
governmental entities are concerned. 
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by 
this act, consent to be sued is granted and 
liability of the entity shall be determined 
as if the entity were a private person. 
The remedy against a governmental 
entity or its employee for an injury caused 
by an act or omission which occurs during 
the performance of such employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority is, after the effective 
date of this act, exclusive of any other 
civil action or proceeding by reason of the 
same subject matter against the employee or 
the estate of the employee whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through 
oross neoligence, fraud, or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action 
aqainst a governmental entity in a repre-
sentative capacity if the act or omission 
complained of is one for which the govern-
mental entity may be liable, but no employ-
ee shall be held personally liable for acts 
or omissions occurrino during the perfo~~ 
- 5 -
mance of the employee's duties within _th" 
~S:2f'.':'_~_f _ _':'_111f'l2i:_l11.':'.'.1l_2!_!:'._'.1~.':'! c 0 l.<J .!::_ ,)-f 
authority, unless it is established that 
the employee acted or failed to ~ct due t~ 
qross negliqence, fraud or malice (emphasis 
added) • 
On i ts face , § 6 3 - 3 0 -4 bars th is act ion . 
however, contend that the statute is I 1) inappl icahlP re,~, 
they acquired vested rights before the effective date ,,t 
amendment, ( 2) was -.inreasonably interpreted by the lower 
to bar personal liability for the individual respondents,''' 
is unconstitutional. Each of these contentions is addressee 
its turn. 
I. APPELLANTS ACQUIRED NO VESTED RIGHTS 
UNTIL AFTER THE 1978 AMENDMENT TO § 63-30-4 
BECAME EFFECTIVE. 
This respondent has no auarrel with appel'.Jr,' 
point that a statute cannot be retroactively applied tn el ic ,-
ate vested riqhts. Silver Kinq Coal Mines v. Ind. Comm., 
Irriaation Co. v. Dist. Court of Salt Lake Count_i'., 99 l't1r 
5 4 4 , 1 0 4 P . 2 d 3 5 3 , 3 6 0 ( 1 9 4 0 I ; 2 S u t h e r 1 a n d , ~ ! ~ l]_l:__C ~ 
Statutory Construct1on 
5 Section 63-30-4 was 
to ''qross negligence." 
41.06 (C. D. Sands 4th ea. )073 
amended in 1983 tc, 
1983 Utah Laws en. 
- 6 -
L'?ITl(l\'E' thr' 
129 § 3. 
,,,, , r~ther, is whether appellants acauired any vested riahts 
'. t'•rP the effective date of the amendment to the statute. 
Appellants propose that they acouired vested rights in 
>n•· Loll of 1977, on the date of the alleged negligent acts by 
•_he individual respondents or, at the latest, upon the removal 
.·f Mrs. Payne's IUD on February 14, 1978. 
A. The four-year statute of repose of S 78-14-4 
vested n~ghts in appellants. 
Section 78-14-4, in pertinent part, provides: 
No malpractice action against the 
health care provider may be brought unless 
it is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, ommission or 
neglect. 
~0pellants contend that this four-year statute of repose "recog-
Cl?Pd the operative effect of the doctors' negligence" and 
!nrli~ated a legislative determination that a medical malpractice 
JJSe of action accrues upon the date of the negligent act 
"· r :-'P l 1 ants ' Br i e f at 1 8 I . Thus, they contend, this claim 
oct•rl (that is, accrued) in the fall of 1977, the date of the 
'kd negligent acts. 
The four-year period is a statute of repose in that it 
,,tf a right of action after the passage of a certain period 
- 7 -
of time without regard to whether the action has "accrued" 
not. A statute of limitations, on the other hand, procedura: 
limits the time in which an action, having accrued, can 
brought. See Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadc 
Continues: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutcc 
of Repose in Products Liability, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 
476 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 899 comment· 
( 1982). 
The four-year period, as a statute of repose, l' 
irrelevant to the accrual or vesting of the cause of acticr,. 
B. The expense of removal of the IUD did no' ves" 
rights in appellants. 
Alternatively, appellants contend that the financ1a, 
obl ig at ions incurred by them for the removal of Mrs. Payne's Jr c 
on February 14, 1978, in reliance on the respondents' alleaeo 
negligent advice 6 , constituted an "injury" and gave tcE1' 
vested rights in the wronqful birth action. 
7 
6 The record does not support appellants' contention thot 
they removed the IUD in reliance upon respondents' represent a· 
tions or that they incurred expenses for that removal. 
7 There seems to be no question but that the wrongful l' 
action on behalf of the infant plaintiff did not vest until 
conception since no "injury" could have been incurred by ri•· 
until after that date. 
- 8 -
Rights do not become vested until a legal remedy upon 
them may be pursued. Stucki v. Loveland, 495 P.2d 571, 573 
(Idaho 1972); Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. T & H Supply co., 
490 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Okla. 1971). In a negligence action, 
vesting occurs, at the earliest, upon breach of a recognized 
duty and resulting injury. Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746, 
747 (Utah 1982); Ind. Comm. v. Wasatch Grading Co., 80 Utah 
223, 235, 14 P.2d 988, 992 (1932). The essential question, 
therefore, is at what point appellants could have brought an 
action against respondents. 
It is undisputed that Mrs. Payne could not have 
been pregnant with Michael until after May 2, 1978, her last 
menstrual period before his birth (R. 690). Since Pelizaeus-
Merzbacher syndrome occurs almost exclusively in males, and 
ma l es born o f car r i er moth e rs have , at most , a one in two 
chance of being affected by the syndrome, the likelihood 
was that appellants' second child would be born unaffected. 
Notwithstanding the alleged negligent advice, had an unaf-
fected child been born to appellants on January 27, 1979, 
they would have had no right to recover for the expense of 
tile IUD removal, since the recovery of that expense was 
contingent upon the conception of an affected male child. 
Rights are not vested if they are subject to contingen-
- 9 -
cies. 
1976). 
C. Rights are not vested in a medical malprac". 
action until discovery of the injury. 
A medical malpractice cause of action accrues 
purposes of the statute of limitations upon discovery of r· 
"injury." § 78-14-4; Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P. 2d 144, 148 :r·: 
1979); and see Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 201,; 
P.2d 435, 436 (1969). Accrual for the purposes of a l 1m1tatlc 
period is the same as accrual for any other purpose. 0 'Hair 
Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 356, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (19701; 1'olc; 
v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 560 P.2d 1127, 1128 
1977); Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Utah 1977). In Fe; 
v. Ballinaer, supra, this Court cited with approval the casr 
Berry v. Branner, 421 P. 2d 966, 998 (Or. 1966 I: 
1968): 
To say that a cause of action accrues 
when she may maintain an action thereon 
and, at the same time, that it accrues 
before she has or can reasonably be expect-
ed to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted 
upon her is patently inconsistent and 
unrealistic. She cannot maintain an action 
before she knows she has one. 
601 P. 2d at 149. 
~ccord, Lavton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794, "98 'l' 
Upon the basis of reason and justice, 
we hold that when an inherently unknowable 
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injury has been suffered by one 
blamelessly ignorant of the act or omission 
and injury complained of, and harmful 
effect thereof develops gradually over a 
period of time, the injury is "sustained" 
when the harmful effect first manifests 
itself and becomes physically ascertainable. 
The 1983 amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act 
recognized this proposition. Section 63-30-11(1) now provides: 
"A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations 
that would apply if the claim were against a private person 
commences to run." 
In this action, the statute of limitations could 
have begun to run, at the earliest, sometime in early 1979, 
following the birth of Michael Payne and the recognition of his 
illness. The 1983 amendment recognized, perhaps, the potential 
for confusion inherent in having one date serve as "accrual" for 
r_;overnmental Immunity Act purposes and another serve as "accru-
al" for limitations purposes. For example, an action could be 
barred (at least as to the governmental entity) under the 
one-year notice provisions of § 63-30-11 before discovery was 
macie and the applicable statute of limitations began to run. 
The amendment to § 63-30-11 is not expressly retro-
,::n· t l VE:. However, the obvious manifestation of legistative in-
'
0 11r reflected in this amendment should not be ignored. Frank v. 
'td_t~, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (holding that a later 
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amendment of the Governmental Immunity Act shoulrl not, , 
matter of judicial policy, be disregarded in an attempt 
discern legislative intent in an earlier-enacted prov 1sic· 
The intent of the Legislature is that the definition of "acer 
al" should be consistent for all purposes. It follows ~> 
appellants' cause of action did not arise and their rights 
not vest until the birth of Michael Payne, nearly a year af:-: 
the effective date of the amendment to § 63-30-4. 
II. THERE IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE "INTERPRE-
TATION" OF § 63-30-4 AND IT BARS THIS 
ACTION~-------------------------------
Appellants contend that ~ 63-30-4 cannot "reas,•nac.·. 
be interpreted to bar personal 1 iabil ity of qovernmental empl 
ees for acts of simple negliqence. Such an "interpretat1c1., 
they assert, is inherently inconsistent with the Indemnificat; 
of Public Officers Act, § 63-48-1, et ~. 8 and violates "pur' 
policy" [Appellant's Brief at 26-33]. 
Section 63-48-4(3) provided that: 
No public entity is obligated to pay 
any judgment based upon a claim against an 
officer or employee if it is established 
8 Repealed as of July l, 1983. 
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that the officer of employee acted or 
failed to act due to gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. 
Appellants argue that this statute is inconsistent 
with § 63-30-4, since there could never be a situation when the 
duty to indemnify would arise. That is, the Governmental 
Immunity Act bars actions arising out of an employee's simple 
negligence, while the Indemnification Act only allows indemnifi-
cAtion for judgments premised upon simple negligence. Thus, 
they argue, § 63-30-4 should be "interpreted" to be consistent 
with § 63-48-3 to allow suits for simple negligence against 
governmental employees. 
The interpretation of a statute to seek consistency 
with another statute on the same subject matter is permissible 
only when the first statute permits of interpretation. Where 
the meaning of the first statute is clear on its face, no 
interpretation or construction is permitted. Sutherland, supra, 
at §§ 46. 01-46. 05. "(T]he meaning of the statute must, in the 
f11st instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framerl, and if that is plain, the sole function of the 
C•>1Jtt ts to enforce it according to its terms." Caminetti v. 
'·,nerl c;tates, 242 u. S. 470, 485 (1917). Other statutes may 
nut hP consulted as an aid to interpretation when no interpreta-
1:1,,n is necessary, that is, when the meaning of the statute is 
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clear and unambiguous. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft _s·u,, 
U. S. 535, 541 (1954); United States v. Williams, 644 f.2d; 
699 (8th Cir. 1981); Sutherland, supra, at§§ 51.01-oc. 
Section 63-30-4 is clear on its face. This Court 
recently held that it means what it says. Madsen v. BorU11c.c 
658 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah 1983). 9 It bars personal liability 
governmental employees for acts of simple negligence. Id. 
has no other conceivable meaning. 10 
I I I. SECTION 63-30-4 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. The statute does not deprive ~lanls_c_ 
access to the courts or of a property right with .. · 
due process of law. 
llppellants contend that § 63-30-4 denies thrn "' 
access to courts guaranteed by Article I, § J 1 of then·· 
Constitution 11 since it precludes any action aqainst a qovP•·-
9 Appellants' assertion that Madsen speaks of the issue cc_ 
in dicta because it dealt with~official" not an "emplO\'E' 
is wrong. § 63-30-2 (3) defines "employee" to include "off1c1; · 
lO Somewhat similar provisions to those found in the repeal· 
Indemnification of Public Officers Act are now found at § 63-
36 through 38. However, no equivalent prov is ion to the repeo 
§ 63-48-3 (4) was reenacted. It is not easily decipherable tr· 
a reading of the new "indemnity" provisions when a govern!l'e1.:· 
employee is entitled to indemnification from his PiilfCI 
11 "All courts shall be open, and for every pers0n, F,,, 
injury done to him in his person, property or rPputat1»n, '' 
have remedy by due course of law . 
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,,r,,\ Pmployee for simple negligence. They acknowledge, 
h, ,,,c ,, e r , t h a t th i s Co u r t has pre v i o us 1 y he 1 d that de pr iv a-
~ L "" of an existing common-law right does not violate 
?rticle I, § 
&MininaCo., 
11. Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining 
13 Utah 108, 191 P.2d 612 (1948) (abolishment 
,-,f ccdl'mon-law action for negligence against an employer by 
thP Occupational Disease Act). As the Court in Truax v. 
Corrigan, 257 u. S. 312 (1921) noted: "[N] o one has a vested 
riqht in any particular rule of the common law, but it is also 
true that the legislative power of a state can only be exerted 
1n subordination to the fundamental principles of right and 
Justice which the guarantee of due process in the Fourteenth 
Amendment is intended to preserve 
Taft:, J. 
257 u. s. at 329, 
See _!~~!1~.E, .Q~~~l~-;::~~ch~~E, 410 U. S. 656 
119731 (filing fee requirement for litigant seeking increase 
'" welfare payments); United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 
il971J (statute reauiring payment of court costs and fees 
r.ankruptcy applicants); Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 u. S. 
\ 'i '1974 I (statute requiring chemical analysis of fertilizer 
re Ln~titution of action for damages); and Everett V. 
'"lma_ri, 3~9 So.2d 1256, 1268 (La. 1978) (medical review panel 
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Appellants have not been deprived of a vested [j'J' 
through the amendment to § 6 3-30-4. 12 Three cases are ci'--
by them in support of their argument that the amendment depri-.; 
them of a property right in violation of the due process prov!'· 
ions of the Utah Constitution. ~ee Spanish Fork West Fie 
_!_rrl_51ation Co. v. Dist. Court of Salt Lake County, supro 
Barrick v. Dist. of Columbia, 173 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1961); i·.: 
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Security Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1C4 
( 1931). However, each of these decisions involved an afte•-
enacted statute that deprived the respective plaintiffs of 
vested right. This respondent does not contend that veste: 
rights may be impaired or destroyed by an after-enacto 
statute. Rather, he contends that appellants acquired c 
vested rights until after the amendment to § 63-30-4 becan: 
effective, and that, therefore, they were deprived of no pre'-
erty rights without due process of law. 
B. 'I'he statute does not de~aepellants ~~ 
protection of the laws. 
Appellants contend that the amendment to § 63-Jn-
deprives them of Equal Protection under the United States 
12 See Point I. 
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Constitutions 13 because it creates an arbitrary and 
irrational classification between claimants injured by state-
employed physicians and claimants injured by privately-employed 
phys 1 c i ans. 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not deny the states the 
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. 
_f!eed ~eed, 304 U. S. 71, 76 (1971). As the court noted: 
The Equal Protection clause of that 
amendment does, however, deny to states the 
power to legislate that different treatment 
be accorded to persons placed by a statute 
into different classes on the basis of 
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective 
of that statute. A classification must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest 
upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relationship to the 
object of the legislation, that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated 
alike. 
If neither a "suspect class" or a "fundamental inter-
est" is involved, the statute must be upheld so long as it bears 
a rat 1onal relationship to a valid state interest. San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 407 U. S. 1 (1973); 
~llen __ v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 
LJ "Nn state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
rl•,'ny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
'f tf1p laws". u. s. Const. amend XIV,§ I. §_ee also, Utah 
(on st . Ar t i c 1 e I , § § 2 and 2 4 . 
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1981); Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System, 122 1 , 
44, 246 P.2cl 591 (1952). 
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Cour 
will not strike down a legislative act unless the interests 
justice in a particular case before it require doing so beo. 
the act is clearly in conflict with a higher law set furtr 
the Constitution. Zamora v. 
1981); Pride Club v. State, 
Draper, 
25 Utah 
635 P. 2d 
2d 3 3 3' 
78, 
481 
80 I Ut 
P. 2d 6r 
( 1971). All doubts should be resolved in favor of the const1c 
tionality of a statute, and no act should be declared uncnno•:-
tution unless it is clearly and palpably so. Ellis v. Soc1: 
Services Dept., Etc., 615 P. 2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1980); Parkt."s 
v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P.2d 400 (1955). It is appE. 
lants' burden to overcome that presumption. 
Appellants argue that there is no rational basis:-
allowing physicians employed by a governmental entity to aver· 
personal liability for medical malpractice actions, s1 
private physicians have such liability, and there is no e 00 " 
tial difference between the two classifications. The issue 
better framed as whether the statutory amendment bears a rat' 
al relationship to a legitimate state concern. Allen v. lnt·-
mountain Health Care, Inc., supra. An obvious and le<Jitirr,.;c 
concern of the amendment is to preserve the integrity ol ,., 
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(~vernmental Immunity Act from circumvention by claimants filing 
suits aaainst individual employees. See Developments in Utah 
La~, 1978 Utah L. Rev. 741, 774-778. The author notes that the 
amendment to § 63-30-4 is a legislative response to a potential 
fnr indirect recovery from the governmental entity through the 
Indemnification Act: 
The amendment, thus, revitalizes the 
safeguards of the Immunity Act in situa-
tions where immunity has been waived, and 
consequently limits the application of the 
Indemnification Act to those suits where 
there has been no waiver and a common-law 
action againt the negligent employee 
provides exclusive remedy. 
See Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 1977) (Wilkins, 
J,, concurring) • Eliminating claims that allege simple negli-
gence and seek personal liability against governmental employees 
guarantees the continued vitality of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. The classification, thus, rests upon a ground having a 
fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate object of 
lPqislation. Reed v. Reed, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1978 amendment to § 63-30-4 did not impair any 
ceEted rights enjoyed by appellants. It can only be interpreted 
t0 har appellants' action against the individual respondents. 
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As a rational attempt to insure the continued integrity ,,1 
Governmental Immunity Act, the amendment is constitutional. 
lower court, thus, properly entered summary judgment on app" 
lants' claims against Dr. Kesler and Dr. Myers. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 1983. 
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